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Reflections on the Asian Financial Crisis
ROBERT HORMATS*

The purpose of this essay is to provide a quick overview of the Asian financial crisis
countries, what has happened to them since the crisis, and where the crisis countries are
going over the next two to three years. First, let me recount briefly the nature of the crisis.
Everyone has his or her own interpretation. I will give you mine.
One of the problems was very "cheap money." Money was very readily available to most
of Asia, because investors were very bullish on the region, and the banks in the area, particularly the Japanese banks, were very liquid and were providers of very large sums of
money through the interbank system. The American banks were much more cautious than
many of the other banks, having been through a similar crisis in Mexico a couple of years
earlier and elsewhere in Latin America before that. Early in the 1990s, the Japanese banks
were quite bountiful in their bank lending.
A second part of the problem was that the recipients in Asia used the money, this super
abundance of money, inefficiently and without proper credit standards. The banking systems in many of these countries are very highly politicized. In many cases, they do not have
the kind of credit standards that we use in the United States. Although in Texas, many of
the savings and loan associations never raised their credit standards a decade ago either and
severely suffered for it. So it is not just a developing country problem. We are very harsh
in blaming Asia, but Texas had similar problems in a much more regulated financial environment. Further, it happened elsewhere, for example, in Sweden over a decade ago. So it
can happen to a broad range of countries. Therefore, we should not go around saying this
is an "Asian only" problem. It is not, although Asia suffered from it very recently. We have
banks worldwide making very poor decisions.
And then the third part of this crisis was that an overhang of leverage had built up.
Excessive borrowing took place internationally and domestically. Korea is a good example:
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huge leveraging of big Korean chaebols (i.e., conglomerates). This would not happen in
the United States today because banks have to report their financial position, and high
leverage would be seen as so dangerous that they would not obtain any more money, if an
institution had that kind of leverage. But in any environment where there is not much
transparency and there is a lot of bullish sentiment, companies got away with this. As a
result of all of this, there was a huge build-up of excess capacity and exorbitant leveraging
of the books of banks and in the private sector.
Now an aspect that made this leveraging worse was that there was a generally accepted
view that the exchange rates of these countries would be kept stable. As such, this was, in
a very substantial way, a problem that affected most of the regions and led to what I consider
to be an enormous "moral hazard." The "moral hazard" was the notion, ultimately incorrect, that governments could and would hold the exchange rates relatively stable. I am not
talking about Hong Kong, where there is a Currency Board. The other countries did not
have Currency Boards. Essentially, it was a pledge by the government to hold the exchange
rate. Well, what happened was that there was a dramatic increase in lending by lenders who
figured that they had no exchange rate risk or very low exchange rate risk (almost zero).
So that built in a measure of confidence that, in the end, was unwarranted.
On the other side of the coin, many borrowers began saying: "Look, my currency, for
example, the baht, is not going to be devalued, so I do not have to worry about currency
risks. And if I can find money at five percent abroad, compared to ten percent in bahts or
won, I am going to take it."
So one begins to find a lot of borrowing internationally from the banks, which lend
money to corporate sectors. This was an enormous problem because it built up an incorrect
set of assumptions. On these assumptions, excessive borrowing took place. This also meant
that the normal hedging techniques that one uses when currency risks are perceived were
not used. One did not have to develop these kinds of techniques, so governments socialized
the risk. The risk was the perception that one would do the borrowing and the government
would make sure the exchange rates stayed the same. Well, ultimately what happened was
that these countries built up very large currency debts over a period of time, because these
currencies were perceived to be tied to the dollar. But the dollar began to appreciate, the
yen began to fall, and these countries all suffered deterioration in their current account and
trade balances. This turned out to be the major factor that began to affect the financial
markets.
Much blame has been placed on the hedge funds. But it was not just the hedge fund.
Domestic investors perceived the problem, pulling their money out. In many cases, the
domestic investors were the first movers. They perceived that their governments could not
sustain high interest rates and protect the currency. They perceived that reserves were being
lost in many of these countries. They perceived that a lot of the loans were not good loans.
And it was found, for instance, in Thailand, that many Thais themselves were moving
money out and pulling their money out of the stock market and putting it into Hong Kong,
Switzerland, New York, or wherever was thought to be a safer haven.
What tended to happen then was when one lost money in one country, say Thailand,
one became very nervous about other countries and one's banks began calling for margin
calls; thus, one had to sell. And where does one sell? You sold in the next most liquid market
of the next most vulnerable market moving from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, then north
to Taiwan, which had some impact, and then, of course, north to Korea. So there was this
problem with investors being nervous, pulling their money out of many markets and looking
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at all of them more or less the same way, although there were obvious differences among
East Asian markets.
Now having said that, what was the legacy of that financial crisis and where does one go
from here? Let me just make a few general observations. First, a major problem at this
point is not so much the growth rates in these economies: the growth rates in these economies are all, one way or another, except in Indonesia (which is in a very different category),
going to look better this year than last. If China is taken out of the equation, probably there
will be a growth rate in the region (leave Japan out too, this will be discussed below) of
about five percent, as opposed to negative five percent in 1998. Now that looks good.
Although sceptics refer to this in some cases as a "dead cat" balance, in other words, whenever there is such a major decline there is going to be some balance. That is not true in all
countries. For example, I think that Korea actually has done a number of very constructive
things, and Korea will probably enjoy a somewhat higher growth rate than most other
countries in the region. But most of these countries are going to experience a fragile economic recovery or are dependent largely on exports unless reforms continue.
But I do not want to focus so much on this, because numbers really do not tell one much.
The real issue I think, and the one I want to focus on, is not the "macro" issues because
the real problem, the real restructuring, the real need for focus in Asia is on the "microeconomic" activities. Let me just "tick off" what I mean.
When I say "microeconomic," I include capital market regulations. Do you allow more flexible capital markets? Some countries, actually, have done quite well in this respect. Malaysia,
the Philippines and Singapore have all made real progress. For instance, Singapore is developing a robust bond market. Most of these countries, however, do not have liquid bond
markets. Lack of a bond market means that there is no benchmark for determining the
risks. The banking system makes the risk judgment. If you had a market-oriented instrument, such as a bond that traded off American bonds or European bonds (Eurobonds), then
one could have some way of judging how the market perceives risk. But, as many of these
countries are without a long-term bond market, it is much harder to perceive market risks.
So capital market deregulation is one "micro" issue that needs addressing.
Do these countries have a bankruptcy system? In many of these countries, there is no such
system. Hong Kong has made much progress in developing an effective one, as has the
Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. But many of these countries do not have a smoothly
functioning bankruptcy system. For example, in Japan, the banks continue to protect companies and therefore, there are not many large bankruptcies. The problem with that is not
so much that anyone wants anyone to go bankrupt, but if one has a huge amount of an
overcapacity, as there is in much of Asia, then one has very few options for dealing with it.
One can subsidize either the inefficient excess capacity, or one has some process for companies going bankrupt that shuts down the most inefficient capacity. One has techniques
like debt equity swaps, which enable banks that have debt outstanding to transfer that debt
into equity, so that the debt is taken off of the books of the companies and there is a
restructuring of the balance sheets. Now this does not deal with the problem entirely.
Bankruptcy is the right answer for some of these companies, but there are other ways of
shifting the risk from debt to equity, which I will address below.
Then there are disclosure requirements.Disclosure requirements in Asia, often referred to as
transparency,are largely inadequate in much of the whole region. This is partly because many
companies are family-owned, partly because there is not the same "Madisonian tradition" that
we have in the United States of a free press that goes in and actually looks at the books of
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companies and puts pressure on companies to open up their books. And, in most other countries, there are not the big pools of money available like those in the United States that insist
on better disclosures. So disclosure throughout most of Asia is really a problem. Singapore
and Hong Kong are the best in that respect in much of Asia. Indonesia is terrible. Many of
these other countries are just not very good in the disclosure department.
Then there is the other side of disclosure, which is accountingand auditing.Most of these
countries have in fact improved auditing and accounting over the last several years. China,
for instance, has focused to a very substantial degree on tighter auditing and tighter disclosure requirements. This is particularly true for Chinese companies that are expected to list
on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ companies that are listing in Hong Kong.
While there have been real improvements in auditing and accounting, it is far from perfect;
but, it is essential first of all, for companies internally to audit accounts; and secondly, if
they want additional capital they are going to need a better auditing and accounting process
for obtaining that capital. Foreign investors now are very suspicious of the "books" of many
Asian companies for good reason. Unless there is credible accounting, it is going to be very
hard to entice anybody to put large sums of money into Asian companies.
Then there is the issue of market opening (i.e., liberalization). Have these countries opened
the opportunities for foreigners to sell financial services in their market? In many cases,
markets in these countries have been relatively closed. Not in all cases, but generally, that
has been true. In Korea, there has been a major opening of the financial markets. For
example, Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank Corp. has purchased Seoul Bank. Now that would
have been virtually impossible five years ago for a large non-Korean bank to buy a large
domestic bank. Most probably, there is going to be more of this happening. I think that is
a remarkable development. That is true in Singapore, but that has been true in Singapore
for a period of time and it is true in Hong Kong. In most of the region, however, it is very
hard for foreign firms to purchase domestic financial institutions.
Here again, Texas is a very good example. One of the economic turnarounds in Texas
was when non-Texas banks bought Texas banks. In the mid- and late-1980s, Texas banks
had major problems. Now North Carolina banks, New York banks and other banks have
bought into the Texas financial system. These larger banks actually helped the domestic
institutions to recuperate, as one saw an influx of foreign money (i.e., the foreign being
"outside of Texas"). In Asia, there is a need to internationalize the banking system to reduce
volatility, which is to say overexpose. A lot more spreading of risks among foreign banks
and financial institutions can assist.
Another "macroeconomic" point that is critically important is managementchanges. That
is to say, in many of these companies there is a need for fresh management. That does not
necessarily mean it has to come from outside. It can come from within the ranks of the
company. But it is very important that when fundamental changes occur (as we have seen
in the United States), when there is a major crisis in the banking system or in the corporate
sector, getting new management is frequently very important, in part because management
comes in with a new style, a "fresh approach." This is beginning to take place in Asia, but
it is not taking place very rapidly. A place such as Hong Kong has superb management.
There is actually some very interesting progress being made in Taiwan with new management in some of the companies. But some of the older Asian companies simply do not want
to part with control, which presents a problem with restructuring because, obviously, if one
does not change the management, the old management does not have quite the same attitude toward restructuring as the new one will.
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Then there is what I call financial restructuring.Let me use Korea as an example, where
there was an enormous amount of cross-guarantees from one part of a chaebols to another.
Restructuring is needed to get rid of those things because one could not really read a Korean
balance sheet and know the exact exposure of the company since one part of the company
group was guaranteeing the debt of another. So there was one very good part of a chaebol,
one very good business in the chaebol, in very deep financial trouble not because of the
way its own business ran, but because it had guaranteed the loans of another chaebol or
another part of a chaebol, that was very inefficient or underwater. Thus, this cross-guarantee
process made it very difficult to read the books of these companies and that became a major
problem. Korea has done a great deal to improve this situation. I use this is as an example
because Korea has come from the country that had the most difficult financial structure on
the corporate side to one of the countries that is moving rapidly in the right direction.
And then there is the last point, and the most tricky, which is the reason why I left it for
last. This is what I call operationalrestructuring(i.e., corporate restructuring). That is to say,
reducing overcapacity, reducing the debt structure of these companies, reducing their leverage. A huge amount of change is required throughout Asia in virtually all areas because
of excess capacity. That requires, among many things, significant shutdowns and layoffs. It
requires, in many cases, restructuring of the management. It also requires, in many cases,
enormous cost-cutting and much more aggressive management in cutting costs. It requires
much more careful use of capital. One of the things that Asia had in abundance for years
was capital. Now there is going to be less capital. The real question for Asia when it recovers
is: does it utilize the capital it has more efficiently?
If one is looking at Asia and asks what the most important thing is that one can think of
to determine whether Asia is going to succeed or fail, company-by-company, bank-by-bank,
country-by-country, over the next couple of years-that question is whether they utilize
capital more efficiently. It is going to require enormous discipline. There is a very interesting comparison between Japan and the United States. For many years, the American
industrial sector lamented the fact that capital was more expensive here. Equity capital, in
particular, was more expensive here. And they said, "Look how cheap it is in Japan." It was
very cheap in Japan. The stock market was going up. If you wanted to borrow, you could
get money very cheaply. One would do a bond with an "equity kicker." There were numerous and very interesting financial instruments that enabled companies to get money
relatively inexpensively. The problem is, and in many countries it is the same way, that when
capital is cheap, the discipline or the use of the capital tends to evaporate. In the United
States, capital was somewhat more expensive. But if one looks now at the return on capital
in the United States versus the return on capital in Japan, it is much higher in the United
States, because the cost of capital (coupled with the discipline of imports, primarily from
Japan, but also from other parts of the world) has caused American companies to utilize
their capital very efficiently.
Is the United States today comparable to Japan ten years ago? I do not think so, because
it is an entirely different environment, largely because of the corporate restructuring. Few
Japanese companies have begun to restructure. The American companies have been engaged for fifteen years in very active, very effective restructuring, utilizing capital better,
with much more efficient management structures and with much greater accountability to
shareholders.
In concluding, let me reiterate a couple of points that I think are very important and
touch on Japan and China.
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Japan is critically important to the East Asian region. We should not forget the economic
power of Japan and we should not write Japan off as a country that cannot succeed. I think,
as reflected in Mr. Horii's essay in this Symposium, that it is a sad story in Japan, as the
government really has not yet risen to the challenge of the global economy. Yes, I think the
Japanese economy has probably bottomed out. Certainly the Bank of Japan is doing all it
can to inject more money into the system. "Call rates" are nearly zero. There are also new
restructuring announcements all the time and yet, there are a lot of risks there. There is
the risk that the economy, which is now tending to rebound with consumption up, could
weaken again.
As the government stimulates the economy, the question is what happens when the Japanese government stimulus ends. There also is over-capacity in the system. Unless there is
process for more bankruptcies or more debt equity swaps (i.e., of ways of working down
that excess capacity and working down the enormous debt over-hang), the Japanese economy is going to face major problems down the road. I think that there is a greater sense of
urgency in Japan today, but it is far from "out of the woods" in putting itself on the course
toward robust growth. The economy may grow a little more this year, but whether the real
restructuring is going to take place remains the unanswered question.
Now I will end with China. The question that is frequently asked is: Will China devalue?
I think that the answer is that China will not devalue, because it is not in its interest to
devalue. It is not because Larry Summers or Alan Greenspan or anyone else says, "please
do not do it" and the Chinese say, "of course, we are not going to do it. We like you so
much, we are not going to do this." The Chinese know it would be disruptive. Quite simply,
it is not in China's interest because, if it devalues too much, then virtually every other
country in the region will likely devalue their currency. China will not be better off. Also,
the problem with China is not that it has lost competitiveness as a result of the stable rembi.
They haven't. Their export problem is primarily weak regional markets, as they recover,
so will Chinese exports. It has not lost market share in the United States or anywhere else.
China lost exports, because the region of Asia where they export a lot is weak; so, of course
the exports are down. But it is not a domestic currency problem.
I think that in 2000 China tbay adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy, and I believe
it should. The United States should not press China to hold its currency stable no matter
what. But for 2000 and beyond, I think the real problem in China is this enormous restructuring of state enterprises. Again, it goes back to the "micro" point that I was making about
the countries in Asia restructuring their state enterprises and restructuring their banks. The
two are very closely integrated.
The Chinese state enterprises (SOEs) are very wasteful of resources. Where do the resources come from? They come largely from the banking system. So what China is trying
to do is to get its SOEs to become more productive, more efficient and to utilize capital
better, or as in the case of some textile industries, to phase out (i.e., to go bankrupt, in
effect, or to lay off a lot of people and improve their structure). Of course, if China accomplishes this, it takes a lot of pressure off the banking system, which has to lend this money
to the SOEs if they do not restructure. The problem, of course, is that one cannot restructure state enterprises too rapidly because they employ very large numbers of people; this
will result in unacceptable levels of unemployment in China, particularly in urban China.
The government, obviously, does not want crowds of unemployed people from steel industries or textile industries on the streets of Shanghai or Guanchou or Wuhan. So there
needs to be a phased restructuring process. That means that someone has to provide capital
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for these losing companies for a period of time and, unfortunately, much of that has to
come from the banking systems.
So the Chinese are in the process of a very long restructuring process. But I will say this
about China. This country learned a great deal from the Asian crisis and they have drawn
the right conclusion. The right conclusions are that one cannot wait until the crisis hits.
The kind of crisis that could hit China, if there were one, is not the kind of crisis that hit
its neighboring countries, because the PRC does not have a convertible currency, thus, one
cannot speculate against the currency as is possible with the won or the baht.
There have been some reports, particularly in the Hong Kong and New York papers,
that the PRC has retreated. Certainly, the PRC has centralized the reform process to a
degree that they did not before because they had problems with independent-minded borrowers incurring a large debt. Whether the Chinese can do what they want as quickly as
they want, which is two to three years, is an open question. Are they doing the right thing?
I think the answer is yes. Can they get support from the provinces? Can they get support
from the Party to undertake these very market-oriented, very structural reforms? That is a
very tough challenge. But certainly, at the top in China, there are very able people, very
committed people. It is a race between the restructuring that is underway and concerns
about employment, which of course are growing. Thus, the answer remains to be seen.
So with that "tour de horizon," I conclude. But I am optimistic that China can meet the
challenge.
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